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Abstract. D. Dieks has proposed a semantical rule which he claims yields a realistic 
interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics without the projection postulate. I 
argue that his proposal is unacceptable because it violates a natural requirement of 
psychophysical parallelism. His "semantical rule" is not an acceptable interpretive rule 
because it does not identify structures in the theory with structures in our experience, but 
postulates a merely probabilistic relationship between the two. Dieks' interpretation is 
contrasted with Everett's relative state interpretation, which attempts the same task but 
respects psychophysical parallelism. 
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In his paper, "Quantum Mechanics Without the Projection Postulate and Its Realistic 
Interpretation" D. Dieks(') has made a persuasive case for a realistic interpretation of 
quantum mechanics which rejects the projection postulate. His view has the merit, which 
I believe it shares with Everett's "relative state" version of the many-worlds interpretation, 
of not adding any extra physical structure to the picture of the statevector evolving 
according to the Schrodinger equation- structure like the hidden variables of the de 
Broglie-Bohm pilot wave model, or the physically distinct universes of some versions of the 
many worlds interpretation. But he claims his view is not the same as Everett's many- 
worlds interpretation. I believe that an acceptable realistic interpretation of the Hilbert 
space statevector and Schrodinger equation formalism which adds no extra structure must 
coincide with Everett's, and insofar as Dieks's interpretation differs from it, it violates what 
I will argue is a plausible principle of psychophysical parallelism. 
Dieks' interpretation is based on a "semantical rule," which I will call rule (D), which 
stipulates that when a composite system has a unique bi-orthonormal decomposition 
(bi-orthonormal meaning that <fl Ivj> and <R, I Rj> = dij), "the partial system represented 
by the I Pk>, taken by itself, can be described as possessing one of the values of the physical 
quantity corresponding to the set { I vk>}. The probabilities €or the various possibilities to 
be realized are given by I ck I *.'I Dieks views this as "a new empirical interpretation" of the 
formalism of statevector subject to unitary Schrodinger evolution. Since measurement 
processes tend to create statevectors bi-orthonormally decomposable, with the I y/k> 
eigenvectors of the observable measured, this semantic rule allows us to state that an 
observed system represented by the lpk> will exhibit a definite value of the relevant 
observable, with the usual quantum mechanical probabilities. This even though the total 
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system statevector is still a superposition, and no projection occurs. And even though the 
superposition remains a correct description of physical reality, we supposedly do not have 
a "many-worlds" interpretation: we observe only one measurement outcome, and there are 
no "other branches" of the world in which our Doppelganger, who have split from us during 
measurement, observe other measurement outcomes. In a sense, "projection" occurs in the 
semantical rule which determines the empirical interpretation of the theory, i.e. the theory's 
relation to observation, but it does not occur at the level of physical reality, Le. of the 
statevector. 
In Dieks' view, his semantical rule is the sort of thing which is necessary in any 
attempt to interpret a physical theory: "certain parts of the models [of the theories] are to 
be identified as empirical substructures; Le., part of the theoretical models have to 
correspond to observable phenomena." I agree with this general characterization of the 
interpretation of theories: the "internal meaning" of the terms of the theory, given by the 
mathematical structures which are models of the theory, needs to be supplemented by 
"empirical meaning." This is done by showing how the theory relates to our experience. The 
usual way of doing this will be by identifying certain objects in models of the theory (or in 
models of the theory plus certain auxiliary assumptions and auxiliary "theories" (possibly 
rather crude) of how our sense-organs work, etc.) with certain of our experiences. 
Implicit in this notion of an empirical interpretation is what I will call the principle 
of psychophysical parallelism: that certain types of physical structure (structure in the 
mathematical model of the physical theory) correspond to certain types of experience. An 
example of this would be the semantical rule, which I will call rule (E),that statevectors 
I R,> for the state of an observer correspond to an observer seeing a pointer indicating a 
value ak, and in a superposition like (l), each of the I Rk> corresponds to an observer 
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seeing a pointer indicating a different value. This, in my view, is Everett's relative-state or 
many-worlds interpretation. Dieks has a different relation between theory and observation. 
He does not suppose that IRk> in a superposition corresponds to an observer seing a 
pointer indicating a value ak; his innovation consists precisely in a semantical rule which 
posits a different correspondence between the mathematical formalism and experiences- 
- a probabilistic correspondence such that while the statevectors I Rk> on their own each do 
definitely correspond to an observer seeing a result Qk, and the states IjL/k> I Rk> to an 
observer seeing such a result while the system is in the kth state, the superposition (1) does 
not correspond to a multiplicity of such observers, but rather corresponds with probability 
Ick12 to a single observer seeing a single result (Yk. I would argue that this is not an 
acceptable semantical rule. Dieks himself says that "The theory is empirically successful if 
the structures which can be discerned in observable phenomena can be isomorphically 
embedded in a theoretical model which is a member of the class of models that defines the 
theory." But Dieks' semantical rule is not an isomorphism between observations and 
theoretical substructures, but a probabilistic relationship between the two. While in the 
relative-state interpretation certain elements of physical reality correspond to certain types 
of experiences, for Dieks a certain type of physical reality (a superposition like (l), with R 
a conscious observing system) may correspond to different types of experiences, with certain 
probabilities, Thus the principle of psychophysical parallelism is violated. One and the 
same physical situation may be the substrate for different configurations of experience. 
Whereas with the relative-state interpretation, though there are of course many 
consciousnesses after measurement, the total configuration of consciousnesses has a one- 
to-one correlation with the overall physical situation. 
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By putting probabilities into the "semantical rule", Dieks has essentially included 
some substantive theory in this rule. One might expect such a rule to contain a certain 
amount of psychological theory, inasmuch as it describes what physical phenomena 
correspond to certain experiences. But the content of Dieks' rule is not of this nature. If 
one wanted to explicitly model this additional substantive theory-- as I would argue a realist 
program requires- one might come up with a structure in which consciousness is linked with 
some special stuff which only travels down one "branch" of the bi-orthonormal superposition 
(1). If we call this a "physical stuff' we now have psychophysical parallelism- consciousness 
of an experimental result ak may now be correlated one-to-one with the physical situation 
described by (1) plus the statement that the special stuff is attached to only one of the 
superposed components. But this sort of "psychophysical parallelism" has some of the spirit 
of Cartesian dualism, in that it postulates a special substance linked to consciousness. This 
view is similar to a version of the MWI considered by d'Espagnat, in which "consciousness 
is a property of physcial systems which is, at any rate, very different from all the other 
properties in that it is not described by the state vector, and which, consequently, is a 
supplementary In our case, the special stuff is not consciousness itself, but it 
zk an extra structure ("hidden variable" of a sort) imposed on the statevector formalism, and 
as such clearly not the sort of thing Dieks would find acceptable. But it is what results from 
making the simplest possible modification of Dieks' theory to respect psychophysical 
parallelism, 
Not only does Dieks argue that his interpretation does not reduce to the MWI, he 
argues that the MWI 's "methodological position is similar to the position of Bohm's theory, 
compared to that of conventional quantum mechanics. The interpretation operates with a 
"model" (the many universes) that contains more than what we propose; but there is no 
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corresponding excess empirical content. There is no empirical support for the additionally 
introduced features."(') I would argue that the situation is roughly the reverse. In discussing 
the MWI, Dieks seems to have in mind versions which propose a physical structure of 
multiple worlds (possibly branching, possibly not), like those discussed by Bell(3) and 
De~ t sch (~) .  But the version of the MWI which I feel is most plausible is Everett's relative 
state interpretation, which introduces no such extra structure. (One might therefore wonder 
if Dieks' interpretation, while he denies it coincides with the MWI, nevertheless coincides 
with Everett's relative state interpretation. Clearly it does not: Dieks believes there is no 
multiplicity of consciousnesses, and the semantical rule (D) he uses to ensure this differs 
from the rule (E) used by the relative state view as discussed above.) The relative state 
theory, as developed by Everett, was intended to allow the derivation of the square 
amplitude probabilities frorn the Schrodinger formalism with the aid of Everett's 
"semantical rule" which specifies the nature of the psychophysical parallelism. Elsewhere 
I have argued that the relative state interpretation is perfectly consistent and that Everett's 
semantical rule follows from natural psychological assumptions about how physical 
substructures corresponding to experiences unify into conscious histories.@) The derivation 
of probabilities from the formalism remains problematic, but whether or not this derivation 
succeeds, I believe Everett was correct to think such a derivation essential to his prdJject of 
a realistic interpretation of the Schrodinger equation. In contrast, Dieks introduces the 
probabilities by postulation in his "semantical rule". Dieks' inclusion of such substantive 
assumptions in this rule vitiates his claim to have provided a realistic interpretation of the 
Schrodinger formalism: when the probabilistic assumption is given its proper place, in the 
theory rather than in the semantical rules, the resulting theory is seen to contain 
"supplementary variables" in addition to the Schrodinger formalism. In my View Dieks' 
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theory fails to provide a realistic interpretation of the formalism of statevector and 
Schrodinger equation without the projection postulate or other supplementary structures 
because it takes the wrong approach, introducing a semantical rule which violates 
psychophysical parallelism and contains a substantive assumption about probabilities which 
has no basis in psychology and physics. Everett’s theory, though its success depends on the 
problematical derivation of probabilities from the formalism, at least takes the correct 
approach of respecting psychophysical parallelism, and attempting to derive the probabilities 
(which do not appear in the Schrodinger equation) from the Schrodinger formalism and 
natural psychological assumptions. 
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